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Abstract 
The more ‘globalization’ transforms ‘national public goods’ demanded by citizens into transnational 
‘aggregate public goods’, the stronger becomes the need for reviewing ‘Westphalian governance 
failures’ and related ‘legal methodologies’ (Section I). Resolving the ‘constitutional problems’ and 
‘collective action problems’ of multilevel governance (e.g. in terms of constituting, limiting, 
regulating and justifying multilevel governance powers, participation and representation of citizens in 
governance and dispute settlement, rule of law protecting cosmopolitan rights) requires supplementing 
national Constitutions by ‘multilevel cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ empowering citizens and 
multilevel governance institutions to realize their collective responsibility for protecting human rights, 
rule of law and other interdependent public goods across frontiers (Section II). The prevailing 
‘political realism’ and ‘constitutional nationalism’ neglect the customary law requirements of 
interpreting international treaties and settling disputes ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, in order to limit 
democratic accountability of governments (Section III). Human rights and multilevel protection of 
‘principles of justice’ require cosmopolitan law based on constitutional, ‘public choice’- and economic 
regulatory strategies limiting multilevel ‘governance failures’ as well as ‘market failures’ (Section IV). 
The human rights obligations of all UN member states limit governmental ‘margins of appreciation’ in 
dealing with economic crises and related austerity programmes (Section V). Governments and courts 
of justice must reconcile and ‘balance’ civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights depending 
on their diverse ‘contexts of justice’ and protect transnational rule of law not only in terms of rights 
and obligations of governments, but also as cosmopolitan rights of citizens as ‘agents of justice’ and 
‘democratic owners’ of all governance institutions (Section VI). 
Keywords 
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Economic Law; Judicial Governance; Legal Methodologies; Multilevel Constitutionalism; Social 
Rights

  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I.  Governance Failures, Justice and Legal Methodology .............................................................. 1 
 
II.  Human Rights Law (HRL) Requires Cosmopolitan Law Protecting Public Goods     
Beyond State Borders ................................................................................................................... 3 
 
III.  Interpretation and Adjudication of IEL ‘in conformity with Principles of Justice’ and                 
Human Rights? .............................................................................................................................. 5 
Which Human Rights? ....................................................................................................................... 5 
How to Construe IEL and its Human Rights Dimensions? ............................................................... 6 
 
IV. Constitutional and Economic Approaches to IEL and their Limits........................................... 8 
Need for Comparative Legal and Institutional Research .................................................................. 8 
Dialectic Evolution of IEL through Legal and Judicial Practices .................................................... 9 
 
V. ‘Margins of Appreciation’ in Legal and Judicial Protection of Social Rights during 
Economic Crises .......................................................................................................................... 11 
Human Rights and the European Economic Crises ........................................................................ 11 
The UN Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt ................................................................................. 12 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations .................................................................................... 13 
HRL Requires Cosmopolitan Rights ............................................................................................... 14 
 
VI.  Human Rights Require Cosmopolitan Law and Transnational ‘Rule of Law’ for the   
Benefit of Citizens ....................................................................................................................... 15 
Need for Cosmopolitan Law Beyond HRL ...................................................................................... 15 
Access to Justice: Lessons from European Law for UN/WTO law and IEL ................................... 17 
Multilevel Judicial Protection of Transnational Rule of Law for the Benefit of Citizens ............... 18 
 
Conclusion: Multilevel Constitutionalism Depends on ‘Struggles for Justice’ and   
‘Cosmopolitan Public Reason’ ................................................................................................... 19 
 
.

 1 
HUMAN RIGHTS REQUIRE ‘COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTIONALISM’ AND COSMOPOLITAN 
LAW FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS 
Prof. Dr. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann* 
I.  Governance Failures, Justice and Legal Methodology 
Law and governance need justification in order to be accepted and supported by citizens as legitimate. 
In contrast to Greek, Roman and Renaissance republicanism justifying governance by the collective 
supply of the common good (res publica) for the benefit of a limited number of free citizens, the 
human rights revolutions since the 18th century aim at institutionalizing human rights, rule of law and 
democratic ‘public reason’ for constitutional self-government respecting and protecting the human 
rights of all human beings. Even though national ‘big C Constitutionalism’ prioritizes self-government 
of ‘We the People’ and the constitutional rights of national citizens, globalization and the universal 
recognition of human rights have led to explicit recognition in ever more national Constitutions of the 
increasing importance of international law and human rights for democratic governance of 
international public goods, including ‘a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ (Article 28 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights = UDHR). The continuing ‘human rights revolutions’ at national levels (e.g. in African 
and Asian countries) and regional levels (e.g. in regional human rights and economic law regimes) 
challenge state-centred ‘Westphalian traditions’ of power politics justifying treaties and international 
organizations by mere state consent. The more globalization transforms national into transnational 
public goods demanded by citizens, the more does legitimate authority at national and international 
levels of governance depend on ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ protecting human rights and rule of law 
for the benefit of free and equal citizens across national frontiers. Yet, even though cosmopolitan 
regional economic and human rights regimes (eg in European law) have succeeded in protecting 
cosmopolitan rights and transnational rule of law more effectively than ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of 
‘international law among sovereign states’ prioritizing rights of governments over rights of citizens1, 
many constitutional and international lawyers, diplomats and also ‘courts of justice’ continue to resist 
– for instance, on grounds of power-oriented ‘state interests’ - ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ and 
related judicial remedies against arbitrary violations of international law. 
The fact that more than 2 billion people live without effective access to protection of human rights, 
rule of law, food, water, health care, education, personal and democratic freedom illustrates that 
worldwide UN and WTO law and governments fail to protect many international public goods 
demanded by citizens. The worldwide financial and environmental crises, and the failure of the 158 
WTO members to conclude their Doha Round negotiations since 2001, also illustrate the failures of 
international economic law (IEL) to effectively regulate ‘market failures’ as well as ‘governance 
failures’ (like private and public debt defaults destroying jobs, savings and investments worth billions 
                                                     
* Emeritus Professor of International and European law and former head of the Law Department of the European University 
Institute, Florence. Former professor at the University of Geneva and its Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
Former legal adviser in the Germany Ministry of Economic Affairs, GATT and the WTO and secretary, member or 
chairman of numerous GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels. This paper was prepared for Panel 4 on Transnational 
Regulation and Social Rights in a World of Crisis: Towards a New Global Economic Constitution at the forthcoming 
conference of the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW on CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC REGULATION AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY on 15-16 April 2013 at Rio de Janeiro. 
1 Cf. E.U. Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel Governance 
of Interdependent Public Goods (Oxford: Hart, 2012), chapter II.  
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of dollars). Arguably, these multilevel governance failures are closely linked to the following three 
‘constitutional failures’: 
1. Apart from European Union (EU) law, there is hardly any other international law regime that 
effectively ‘institutionalizes’ human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ through multilevel 
constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial governance of international public goods 
demanded by citizens. For instance, the Bretton Woods Agreements and WTO law do not even 
mention human rights and democratic governance. 
2. The transformation of ever more national public goods into transnational ‘aggregate public 
goods’ (like universal human rights, transnational rule of law, financial stability, efficient 
global markets coordinating the global division of labour) reveals national Constitutions as 
‘partial constitutions’ that can no longer protect many public goods demanded by citizens 
without providing for more effective, multilevel legal protection of international public goods. 
3. Legal methodologies in most international legal regimes as well as in many national legal 
systems of UN member states remain dominated by power politics prioritizing rights of states 
and governments (eg veto powers in the UN Security Council) over rights of citizens. Legal, 
economic and ‘public goods theories’ fail to provide coherent theories for more effective and 
more legitimate governance of international public goods. Can these multilevel ‘constitutional 
failures’ be overcome? 
Almost all UN member states have adopted national constitutions constituting, limiting, regulating and 
justifying governments and acknowledging human rights. Foreign policies, however, continue to be 
dominated by power-oriented ‘intergovernmentalism’ (e.g. in UN institutions, the WTO) and foreign 
policy discretion to violate international law. Only the 27 EU member states have delegated 
comprehensive legislative, executive and judicial powers to supranational institutions and 
acknowledge the legal primacy, direct effect and ‘direct applicability’ of precise and unconditional EU 
rules inside their national legal systems for the benefit of citizens. The necessary adjustment of 
‘constitutional nationalism’ to the requirements of multilevel governance for the collective supply of 
international public goods necessitates reviewing the obvious ‘governance failures’ based on state-
centred legal methodologies.2 UN law does not limit the ‘sources’ and ‘rules of recognition’ of 
international law to ‘international conventions … recognized by states’ (Article 38,a Statute of the 
ICJ); the additional sources – like ‘(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) …judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law’ (Article 38 ICJ Statute) – require subjecting state consent to 
recognition by citizens, civil society, parliaments and courts of justice; the universal recognition of 
human rights refutes claims by diplomats that they control the ‘opinio juris sive necessitatis’ as 
traditional gate-keepers of ‘Westphalian international law among states’. The customary rules of treaty 
interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide for interpretation 
based on text, context, objective and purpose (cf. Articles 31-33) ‘in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (Preamble 
VCLT). In contrast to the interpretation methods practiced in many national jurisdictions and in view 
of the lack of parliamentary law-making in most international organizations, the preparatory drafting 
history is recognized only as a ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ (cf. Article 32). Hence, as 
illustrated by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), judicial interpretation of 
‘rules of recognition’ in conformity with human rights and clarification of ‘constitutional principles’ 
common to the member states of international organizations (e.g. underlying their common human 
                                                     
2 Legal methodology is defined here in terms of the conceptions of the sources and ‘rules of recognition’ of law, the methods 
of interpretation, the functions and systemic nature of legal systems, and of the relationships between rules, principles, 
political and legal institutions and related practices; cf. E.U.Petersmann, Methodological Pluralism and its Critics in 
International Economic Law Research, in: JIEL 15 (2012), 921-970. 
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rights obligations) enable ‘judicial constitutionalization’ of international treaty law for the benefit of 
citizens and their constitutional rights. Judicial clarification of incomplete legal rules and principles is 
recognized as integral part of judicial dispute settlement at national, regional and worldwide levels 
(e.g. in WTO jurisprudence) and in multilevel cooperation among national and international courts 
(e.g. national courts implementing international judgments, preliminary rulings or arbitral awards). 
Both in US antitrust law as well as in European economic law, courts have likened individual 
plaintiffs enforcing common market and competition rules to ‘attorney generals’ promoting also 
‘community interests’ rather than only individual self-interests.3 Following the post-war recognition of 
human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ as integral parts of national and international legal 
systems, ever more national and international courts throughout Europe interpret international 
guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law for the benefit of citizens even if the 
international rules were addressed to states without explicitly providing for cosmopolitan rights: 
‘the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in 
compliance with the obligations thus laid down (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 
455, par. 31). Such consideration must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty, 
which … is designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market’.4 
Arguably, the increasing legal and judicial guarantees of ‘access to justice’5 and of cosmopolitan 
rights offer individuals similar instruments to enforce precise and unconditional rules in citizen-driven 
areas of international law (like IEL) in decentralized and de-politicized ways against illegal 
government restrictions. In view of the need for legal and judicial ‘balancing’ of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural human rights, ‘constitutional justice’ (e.g. multilevel constitutional 
protection of equal freedoms and human rights) and impartial judicial protection of transnational rule 
of law on the basis of ‘legal balancing’ can be seen as the ‘ultimate rule of law’.6 The worldwide 
economic, environmental and poverty crises suggest that, in order to meet their democratic 
responsibility for protecting international public goods more effectively, citizens, civil society, 
parliaments and courts of justice must challenge abuses of ‘intergovernmental power politics’ and the 
ubiquity of ‘governance failures’ and ‘market failures’ in international relations. 
II. Human Rights Law (HRL) Requires Cosmopolitan Law Protecting Public Goods 
Beyond State Borders 
The human rights obligations of all UN member states protect the ‘moral powers’ of individuals to 
pursue diverse conceptions for a ‘good life’ and for legal and social justice necessary for collective 
supply of public goods; respect for such legitimate individual and democratic diversity entails 
‘constitutional pluralism’ protecting the fact of ‘reasonable disagreement’ among free and equal 
citizens.7 The common responsibility of citizens and UN member states for protecting international 
public goods further requires constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying governance powers 
beyond states with due regard for citizens as legal subjects and sources of justification also of 
                                                     
3 This conception was emphasized by the CJEU in its Van Gend en Loos judgment (Case 26/62, ECR 1963, 1): ‘the vigilance 
of the individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision 
entrusted by (ex) Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and the Member States’.  
4 Cf. Case C-281/98, Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.  
5 Examples include Article 8 UDHR, Article 13 ECHR, Art.47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Arts. 3 and 7 African 
Charter of Human and People’s Rights, Arts. 8 and 25 Inter-American Charter of Human Rights; cf. F.Francioni (ed), 
Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford: OUP, 2007).  
6 Cf. D.M.Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
7  On the ‘two moral powers’ and the need for recognizing that ‘justice is prior to the good in the sense that it limits the 
admissible conceptions of the good’, see: J.Rawls, Collected Papers, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 
386, 312. 
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international law. This constitutional foundation and limitation of modern national and international 
legal systems through ‘inalienable rights of all members of the human family (as) the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world’, based on ‘a common understanding of these rights’ as 
specified in the 1948 UDHR and progressively developed through national, regional and worldwide 
HRL, transforms ‘constitutional nationalism’ into multilevel ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’. The 
EU sets a worldwide example, as recognized by the conferral to the EU of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, 
for the practical possibility of realizing the ‘Kantian moral imperative’ of transforming 
intergovernmental power politics into ‘democratic peace’ based on legislative, administrative and 
judicial institutionalization of HRL based on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and on multilevel judicial protection of human rights 
as common constitutional principles of EU member states. The universal human rights obligations of 
all UN member states require democratic governance8 recognizing citizens as ‘democratic principals’ 
of representative lawmaking by governance institutions with limited powers. As illustrated by the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), the citizen-driven and rights-based nature of international economic 
cooperation justify ‘constitutional interpretations’ of IEL and HRL protecting cosmopolitan rights of 
citizens and non-governmental organizations (e.g. fundamental rights of companies protected by all 
European courts) rather than only rights of governments. Just as rights-based national democracies 
evolve in response to democratic ‘struggles for rights’, so does collective supply of international 
public goods depend on empowering citizens through cosmopolitan rights and judicial remedies to 
participate in, control and benefit from multilevel governance so as to limit the ubiquity of abuses of 
public and private powers in ‘Westphalian governance’ of international public goods. 
The human rights obligations of all UN member states under the UN Charter, UN human rights 
conventions and under general international law continue to evolve and confirm that ‘(a)ll human 
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’; ’it is the duty of States, regardless 
of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.’9 The references - in human rights treaties and national bills of rights - to the 
UDHR support the view that most rights enumerated in the UDHR have become part of general 
international law and ‘inalienable rights’ of human beings that constitutionally limit all national and 
international governance powers.10 Just as the EU is constitutionally founded on and limited by respect 
for human rights and rule of law (Article 2 TEU), HRL requires interpreting the powers of all 
international institutions (like the UN) as being constitutionally limited by human rights and related 
rule of law principles. Neither national governments nor international governance institutions have 
legitimate powers to unduly restrict ‘inalienable’ and ‘indivisible’ civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights of citizens, notwithstanding the diverse democratic preferences and scarcity of 
resources for fulfilling and ‘balancing’ these rights in national and international jurisdictions. The 
‘multilevel human rights constitution’11 remains embedded into national constitutionalism as protected 
                                                     
8 See, e.g., Article 21(3) UDHR: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’. The UDHR guarantees of freedom of expression (Article 19), freedom of 
assembly (Article 20) and democratic participation (Article 21) are confirmed in many UN and regional human rights 
conventions and national constitutions and render non-democratic governance powers illegitimate.   
9 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the UN World Conference on Human Rights by more than 170 
states on 25 June 1993 (A/CONF.157/24, para.5). This ‘universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing’ nature of human rights was reaffirmed by all UN member states in numerous human rights instruments such 
as UN Resolution 63/116 of 10 December 2008 on the ‘60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(UN Doc A/RES/63/116 of 26 February 2009).  
10 Cf. O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge : CUP, 2010), at 50 ff. 
11 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging UN 
Human Rights Constitution, in F.A.Abbott/C.Breining/T.Cottier (eds), International Trade and Human Rights (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), at 29-67.  
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by national and regional courts. Yet, as human rights have not been effectively institutionalized in UN 
law and other worldwide institutions (like the WTO), they do not effectively constrain power-oriented 
‘Westphalian intergovernmentalism’ based on ‘sovereign equality of states’ protecting governments 
rather than citizens and their human rights. UN member states only rarely use the UN Human Rights 
Council and the ICJ for enforcing human rights vis-à-vis other governments; the UN human rights 
treaty bodies lack effective legal powers and judicial remedies. Human rights are neither mentioned 
nor effectively protected in most worldwide and regional economic agreements outside Europe. Most 
national legal systems of UN member states focus one-sidedly on protecting civil and political rights 
(e.g. in US constitutional law and practices) or economic rights (e.g. in communist countries like 
China) without multilevel, legal and judicial protection of the ‘indivisibility’ and ‘interdependence’ of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as required by UN HRL. EU law and the law of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) offer the most developed regional legal systems for multilevel 
judicial protection of integrated civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, based on an 
innovative methodology of ‘dignity rights’ (Title I EU FRC), liberty rights (Title II), equality rights 
(Title III), solidarity rights (Title IV), citizen rights (Title V) and access to justice (Title VI) protected 
by national and European courts (e.g. the CJEU, the EFTA Court, the ECtHR) in addition to the 
diverse national constitutional rights guaranteed in European states.  
III. Interpretation and Adjudication of IEL ‘in conformity with Principles of Justice’ 
and Human Rights? 
The customary methods of international treaty interpretation and dispute settlement, as codified in the 
VCLT and UN law (e.g. Article 1 UN Charter), require interpreting treaties and settling disputes ‘in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law’, including ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’ (Preamble VCLT). As states have accepted diverse human and 
constitutional rights obligations at national, regional and worldwide levels and implement them in 
diverse legal systems, judicial interpretations of the human rights dimensions of IEL may legitimately 
differ among jurisdictions. Arguably, the unwillingness of many UN and WTO member states to 
recognize cosmopolitan rights of citizens to compliance by governments with their UN and WTO legal 
obligations remains the main obstacle to protecting human rights and transnational public goods more 
effectively.  
Which Human Rights? 
Every UN member state has ratified one or more of the 9 core UN human rights treaties12, and more 
than 80% of all UN member states have ratified the ICCPR and/or the ICESCR; hence, whatever the 
intent of the governments which voted for the UDHR, most rights stipulated in the UDHR have 
acquired the status of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.13 As specified in the 
UDHR and confirmed also in many national constitutions, all human beings have rights to non-
discrimination (Article 2), to life, liberty and security (Article 3), prohibitions of slavery, servitude 
(Article 4) and of torture (Article 5), rights to recognition as a person before the law (Article 6) and to 
equality before the law (Article 7), rights to judicial remedies (Article 8) and to a fair trial (Article 10), 
freedom from arbitrary arrest (Article 9), presumption of innocence (Article 11), rights of privacy and 
                                                     
12 These include the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966 Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1990 Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the 2006 Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and the 2006 Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.   
13 De Schutter (note 10), at 16.  
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of honour (Article 12), rights to freedom of movement and residence (Article 13), rights to asylum 
(Article 14), to a nationality (Article 15), to marry and to protection of the family (Article 16), rights 
to own property (Article 17), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18), freedom of 
opinion, expression and information (Article 19), freedom of assembly and association (Article 20), 
rights to democratic self-governance (Article 21) and social security (Article 22), labour rights (Article 
23), rights to rest and leisure (Article 24), to an adequate standard of living (Article 25) and education 
(Article 26), rights to participate in cultural life and author’s rights (Article 27) and rights ‘to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized’ (Article 28 UDHR). It remains contested to what extent the treaty obligations of the 160 
parties of the ICESCR to ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of (their) available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’ 
(cf. Article 2) go beyond their general international law obligations as codified in the UDHR, notably 
as regards the right to work (Article 6), the right to just and favourable conditions of work (Article 7), 
trade union rights (Article 8), rights to social security (Article 9), family rights (Article 10), rights to 
an adequate standard of living (Article 11) and of health (Article 12), rights to education (Articles 13, 
14) and cultural rights (Article 15 ICESCR). The ICESCR recognizes the interdependence of human 
rights by requiring, for instance, that the right to work must be realized ‘under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual’ (Article 6); ‘the ideal of free human 
beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights’ 
(Preamble ICESCR). These conditions depend ever more on IEL protecting a mutually beneficial 
global division of labour enabling all countries and citizens to increase their access to scarce goods, 
services and other resources. 
How to Construe IEL and its Human Rights Dimensions? 
‘Justice’, human rights, democracy and rule of law – like many provisions of IEL - are ‘interpretive 
legal concepts’ which people share even though they often disagree about the criteria for interpreting 
and applying the legal terms. Hence, as explained by Dworkin14,  
• at the ‘semantic stage’, a ‘useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be an 
interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the concept 
figures’;15 
• at the ‘jurisprudential stage’, the legal interpreter must search for the values that supply the best 
interpretation of the aspirational values of legal concepts like rule of law, including the ‘ideal of 
political integrity’ as a requirement of governing ‘through a coherent set of political principles 
whose benefits extend to all citizens’ and legitimize coercive power of states;16 
• at the ‘doctrinal stage’, the ‘truth conditions of propositions of law’ must be constructed ‘in the 
light of the values identified at the jurisprudential stage’ so that legal justifications fit the 
practice as well as the values that the practice serves (e.g. the constitutional and procedural 
practices in which legal claims are embedded);17  
• at the ‘adjudicative stage’, courts of justice deploying the monopoly of coercive power must 
impartially and independently review whether the enforcement of the law in particular cases by 
                                                     
14 Cf. R.Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), chapter 1. 
15 Id., at 12.  
16 Id., at 13.  
17 On the two tests of ‘fit’ and ‘value’ as ‘different aspects of a single overall judgment of political morality’ and ‘best 
justification’ of legal practices see id., 15-17.   
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political officials is legally justified by ‘the best interpretation of legal practice overall’;18 
according to Dworkin’s ‘adjudicative principle of integrity’, judges should interpret law - in 
conformity with its objectives of legality, rule-of-law and its underlying constitutional principles 
of justice - as expressing ‘a coherent conception of justice and fairness’: ‘Law as integrity asks 
judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of 
principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce 
these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person’s situation is fair and just 
according to the same standards.’19 
There is increasing agreement on taxonomic and sociological conceptions of IEL. Legal systems are 
perceived as a union of 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary rules' of recognition, change and 
adjudication20 that dynamically interact with changing legal practices by private and public actors, 
who often justify legal claims and interpretations of rules by invoking legal principles. There is also 
agreement on the need for proving positive law as social facts that must be distinguished from 
normative proposals for changing the existing rules. Yet, governments, national and international 
courts and private actors disagree on which doctrinal conceptions and ideal conceptions should guide 
the interpretation and development of IEL. For instance: 
• Most governments perceive IEL as a part of public international law regulating the 
international economy on the basis of ‘sovereign equality of states’, related ‘Westphalian value 
premises’ (e.g. protecting rulers and their financial dealings regardless of their democratic 
legitimacy), UN law (e.g. IMF and World Bank law) and the WTO. 
• Global administrative law (GAL) conceptions aim at limiting abuses of power by emphasizing 
multilevel administrative law principles underlying the law of international organizations (e.g. 
the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO) such as principles of transparency, legal accountability, 
limited delegation of powers, due process of law and judicial remedies. 
• Multilevel regional IEL is often limited to constitutional democracies (e.g. in NAFTA) 
prioritizing national constitutional, competition and environmental regulations and judicial 
remedies subject to limited international legal restraints. 
• EU law – and to a lesser extent also EEA law – have adopted multilevel constitutional IEL for 
the regulation of their common markets and related fundamental rights of citizens. 
• Transnational commercial and investment law and arbitration emphasize the reality of ‘legal 
pluralism’ and the advantages of coordinating competing jurisdictions through ‘conflict of law’ 
principles and approaches.   
The five competing conceptions of IEL prioritize different value premises (such as state sovereignty, 
multilevel administrative or constitutional law principles, constitutional nationalism, international 
private law principles). Their different narratives are due to different legal doctrines, policy 
approaches and justifications of IEL (e.g. in utilitarian or ‘deontological’ terms). Yet, ‘doctrinal 
eclecticism’ and related interest group politics undermine the legitimacy, legal coherence and political 
effectiveness of multilevel IEL regulation. Limiting the existing ‘fragmentation’ (e.g. in legal 
conceptions and regulation of IEL) and the ubiquity of abuses of public and private power in 
transnational financial, trade and environmental regulation requires stronger compliance with the 
customary law requirements of justifying IEL in terms of inclusive ‘principles of justice’ and human 
rights rather than only in terms of alleged ‘state interests’, administrative law principles, domestic 
                                                     
18 Id., at 18, 25.   
19 R.Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) 225, 243. Even though Dworkin developed 
this legal methodology for national legal systems, the methodology is legally applicable also for the international 
requirement of international treaty interpretation ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and the human rights 
obligations of states (cf. Preamble and Article 31 VCLT). 
20 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1994), chapter V. 
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interest group politics and ‘conflicts of law’ principles. Arguably, the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation  and the ‘rules of recognition’ require reconciling the five IEL conceptions in mutually 
coherent ways based on ‘principles of justice’ and human rights limiting abuses of powers. Courts of 
justice should impartially and independently interpret, justify and develop IEL reconciling the 
doctrinal perspectives in order to protect transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens 
cooperating in the global division of labour. Cooperation among national and international courts and 
the ‘consistent interpretation’ requirements of national and international legal systems (cf. Article 31 
VCLT) are essential for complying with the customary law requirements of interpreting treaties and 
settling disputes ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and the human rights obligations of all UN 
member states to protect ‘rule of law’. Multilevel judicial remedies can strengthen the human rights 
obligations of all UN member states and their related ‘sovereign responsibilities’ and ‘duties to 
protect’ basic needs and fundamental rights of citizens; yet, courts must respect legitimate 
‘constitutional pluralism’ and the only limited ‘overlapping consensus’ on ‘principles of justice’ 
among governments and citizens with reasonably diverse conceptions of a ‘good life’ and ‘political 
justice’. 
IV. Constitutional and Economic Approaches to IEL and their Limits 
UN HRL does not protect the economic liberties (like freedom of profession), common market 
freedoms and property rights protected in European law in conformity with the constitutional 
traditions of European states. Nor does it indicate how private and public economic activities should 
be regulated in order to maximize consumer welfare and protect the basic needs of all human beings. 
Hence, the ‘human rights approaches’ advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for 
interpreting and developing IEL21 must be complemented by constitutional, legislative, administrative 
and judicial regulation of the economy at national and international levels. For instance,  
• in international organizations without parliamentary control (like the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the ILO, the WTO), the regulation of the legal ‘checks and balances’ among political and 
judicial institutions may depend more on diverse conceptions of ‘constitutional democracy’ and 
participatory ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ than on specific human rights; 
• the regulation of ‘market failures’ through competition, environmental, social and consumer 
protection laws and policies may be guided more by economic theories (e.g. on ‘internalizing 
external effects’) than by human rights considerations; 
• the limitation of ‘governance failures’, for instance by the legal ranking of trade policy 
instruments in GATT/WTO law, is more influenced by economic theories than by HRL which is 
nowhere mentioned in WTO law; 
• the regulation of other ‘collective action problems’ in supplying international public goods may 
be guided by ‘public choice’- and ‘public goods’-theories emphasizing the diversity of 
‘production strategies’ for ‘single best effort public goods’ (like an invention), ‘weakest link 
public goods’ (like nuclear non-proliferation) and ‘aggregate public goods’ (like ‘rule of law’).22  
 
Need for Comparative Legal and Institutional Research 
Comparative, legal, economic and institutional analyses are needed for evaluating which regulatory 
alternatives have proven to be more efficient and more legitimate.23 Cosmopolitan conceptions of IEL 
                                                     
21 For an overview see: J. Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the WTO (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
22 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), at 25 f, 56 f, 94 ff. 
23 Cf. M.Hilf/E.U.Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law (London: Kluwer, 1993).  
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and multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights by the CJEU inside the EU, the EFTA Court 
inside the EEA, the ECtHR in the context of the ECHR, by investor-state arbitral tribunals and 
national courts in international investment law, as well as by commercial arbitration and national 
courts in international commercial law have proven to protect transnational rule of law for the benefit 
of citizens more effectively and more efficiently than state-centred ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of IEL 
prioritizing rights of governments and excluding effective judicial remedies of citizens (e.g. for 
enforcing WTO law in domestic courts).24 The multilevel ‘judicial governance’ by the CJEU, the 
EFTA Court, the ECtHR and national courts suggests that their common focus on teleological and 
‘systemic’ (e.g. comparative) rather than merely textual interpretations of European treaties is more in 
line with the customary methods of international treaty interpretation25 than with the judicial methods 
applied by national courts (such as judicial deference towards parliamentary majority decisions, focus 
on preparatory work of statutes in order to respect the intentions of legislators). In contrast to most 
worldwide jurisdictions, all three European tribunals emphasize their ‘constitutional embeddedness’ 
and commitment to protect human rights and other constitutional principles common to their member 
states. Such constitutional restraints have not prevented the active use of judicial powers for limiting 
abuses of power, protecting ‘new’ fundamental rights of EU citizens, and promoting new forms of 
‘integration through law’ and incremental (small ‘c’) ‘constitutionalization’ of multilevel governance, 
with due respect for national constitutional diversity as a positive value protected by HRL. 
Dialectic Evolution of IEL through Legal and Judicial Practices 
Constitutions committed to ‘establish justice’ (as stated in the Preamble of the US Constitution) 
through democratic legislation and judicial protection of human rights, including rights ‘retained by 
the people’ (as stated in the Ninth Amendment), offer dynamic legal frameworks for ‘participatory’ 
and ‘deliberative democracy’ claiming, recognizing, legalizing and enforcing economic and social 
rights, such as rights to food, water, health protection, education and housing that are increasingly 
protected in state constitutions, legislation, administrative regulations, judicial remedies and 
international agreements in developed as well as less-developed democracies. Similar to judicial 
protection of innovative constitutional and human rights in many national jurisdictions in Africa, the 
Americas, Europe and Asia26, also regional economic and human rights courts – in Europe and, 
increasingly, also in Africa and Latin America - are interpreting regional economic and human rights 
conventions in mutually coherent ways as requiring judicial review of economic restrictions with due 
regard also to HRL.27 For example,  
• a 2012 judgment by the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States 
found the Nigerian government responsible for environmental and human rights abuses by oil 
companies and other perpetrators, notably violating Articles 21 (on the right to natural wealth 
and resources) and 24 (on the right to a general satisfactory environment) of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights;28  
                                                     
24 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), chapter II. 
25  The CILFIT formula – according to which ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Community as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof’ (Case 
283/81, CILFIT, ECR 1982, 3415, para. 20) – is fully consistent with the interpretation methods codified in Article 31 
VCLT. 
26 Cf. the jurisprudence in South Africa, Colombia, Ghana, India, European and North American countries discussed by K.G. 
Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); V.Gauri/D.M.Brinks (eds), 
Courting Social Rights. Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); B.G.Ramcharan (ed), Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Leiden: M.Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 
27 For examples see: E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’, in: EJIL 19 
(2008), 769-798.  
28  Cf. Amnesty International Press Release PRE01/619/2012. 
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• the ‘judicial balancing’ of economic and human rights in the MERCOSUR arbitral award of 6 
September 2006 concerning the ‘Bridges case’ between Argentina and Uruguay explicitly 
referred to the ‘balancing methodology’ applied by the CJEU with regard to economic rights and 
human rights in European economic law.29  
Yet, even though Article 1 of the founding Treaty of Asuncion commits MERCOSUR to establishing 
a common market, MERCOSUR remains an imperfect customs union without multilevel legal and 
judicial protection of common market freedoms and other fundamental rights as in EU law.30 
Multilevel judicial remedies have a long tradition in the Andean Common Market as well as in the 
Caribbean Free Trade Area; the judicial review system in MERCOSUR was strengthened by the 
establishment of a Permanent Review Court for appeals against ad hoc arbitral awards and for 
consultative opinions at the request of national supreme courts.31 In Africa, by contrast, the 
jurisprudence of regional economic and human rights courts is less established. For instance, 
Zimbabwe’s refusal to comply with the 2008 judgment of the Southern African Development (SADC) 
Tribunal against Zimbabwe’s illegal expropriations of white farmers entailed the subsequent 
dissolution of the SADC Tribunal by SADC governments.32 It remains doubtful whether the African 
Court on Human Rights and People’s Rights will declare in an advisory opinion – as requested, in 
November 2012, by some African non-governmental organizations - that this dissolution of the SADC 
Tribunal deprived African citizens of their human rights to effective judicial remedies. 
‘Judicial balancing’ of economic freedoms with non-economic rights and public interests subject to 
requirements of transparency, non-discrimination, ‘suitability’, necessity, ‘proportionality stricto 
sensu’ and legal accountability is increasingly recognized by national and international courts as ‘best 
standard’ for reconciling competing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Yet, 
cooperation among national and international courts in protecting transnational rule of law for the 
benefit of citizens remains neglected in many regional economic law systems outside Europe. Inside 
the EU, national courts rightly insist on sovereign rights of member states to scrutinize whether EU 
acts are ‘ultra vires’, violate the ‘national constitutional identity’ (cf. Article 5 TEU) or fail to protect 
constitutional safeguards equivalent to national fundamental rights.33 Judicial reasoning and ‘judicial 
dialogues’ are important for promoting ‘judicial comity’, national compliance with IEL and HRL as 
interpreted by international courts, and the search for ‘the best fit’ of judicial interpretations. For 
instance, the Mangold judgement by the CJEU on age discrimination in employment - which was 
widely criticized for exceeding the borderline separating law from policy - was reluctantly accepted by 
the German Constitutional Court as a ‘methodologically justifiable development of the law’34; such 
conditional cooperation among supreme courts illustrates that the validity and legitimacy of legal rules 
may depend no less on respect for diverse legal methodologies than on the outcome of judicial 
decisions. By connecting novel interpretations to the aims of regional treaty systems and of national 
constitutional systems, national authorities may find it easier to accept the reasonableness of 
international judgments as judicial ‘clarification’ of their existing legal obligations.35 Legal and 
                                                     
29 See L Lixinski, Human Rights in MERCOSUR, in: M.Filho/L.Lixinski/M.Giupponi (eds), The Law of MERCOSUR 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 351 ff. 
30 Cf. F.Fuders, Economic Freedoms in MERCOSUR, in: Filho/Lixinski/Giupponi (note 29), 87-130. 
31 Cf. N.Susani, Dispute Settlement, in: Filho/Lixinski/Giupponi (note 29), 73-85. 
32 Cf. O.C.Ruppel, The Case of Mike Cambell and the Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal, in: N.Madolo (ed), International 
Economic Law. The Voices of Africa, Cape Town : Silber Ink, 2012, 141-159. 
33 Cf. the Lisbon judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267.   
34 Case C-144/04 Mangold ECR 2005 I-9981; BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010 (‘Dem Gerichtshof ist auch die 
Rechtsfortbildung im Wege methodisch gebundener Rechtsfortbildung nicht verwehrt’).  
35 An example is the justification by the CJEU of the need for European ‘uniform interpretations’: ‘According to settled case 
law, the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision 
of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining 
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judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights promotes not only more inclusive ‘public reason’ and more 
democratic conceptions of the relevant ‘rules of recognition’ as ‘tests’ for legitimate interpretations of 
IEL and justifications of its principled coherence with human rights and other ‘principles of justice’. 
Human rights also justify reviewing the ‘Westphalian methodologies’ of WTO dispute settlement 
bodies and ‘investor biases’ in investment arbitration in order to protect reasonable citizen interests 
more effectively. Even though national parliaments have not transferred any powers to the EU for 
arbitrary violations of international law, the CJEU fails to protect EU citizens against welfare-reducing 
violations of the EU’s WTO obligations; it disregards legally binding WTO dispute settlement rulings 
on the ground that EU politicians prefer ‘freedom of manoeuvre’36 to violate international law even if 
no evidence has been submitted how illegal trade restrictions could serve legitimate ‘Community 
interests’.  
V. ‘Margins of Appreciation’ in Legal and Judicial Protection of Social Rights 
during Economic Crises 
The financial and economic crises since 2008 have forced many governments to reduce levels of 
public borrowing, to cut public spending on social protection in order to prevent an unsustainable 
build-up of public debt, and to adopt austerity programs so as to avoid a debt default.  
Human Rights and the European Economic Crises 
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has monitored social problems of the economic crisis 
(e.g. of vulnerable groups like children, women and unemployed people, xenophobia against foreign 
migrants). It emphasized that governmental restrictions must be publicly justified, remain non-
discriminatory and protect fundamental rights and the welfare especially of the poorest and most 
vulnerable.37 As regards rights to social protection guaranteed by the EU CFR (Article 34), the 1961 
European Social Charter (Articles 12-13) as well as by Article 9 ICESCR, the Agency found ‘that the 
level of protection provided remained adequate in terms of guaranteeing a “decent existence”, despite 
the reductions in overall expenditure’.38 The EU responses to the crises included, inter alia, increased 
financing of ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ measures (e.g. based on the 1958 European 
Social Fund, the 1974 European Regional Development Fund, the 1994 Cohesion Fund, the 2006 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund) and of other investments (e.g. financed by the European 
Investment Bank), ‘bailouts’ for over-indebted Eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, 
Spain, Cyprus), balance-of-payments assistance to other EU member states (like Latvia, Hungary, 
Romania) that do not use the Euro as their currency, and additional fiscal disciplines under Article 126 
TFEU and the related ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ aimed at preventing unsustainable build-ups of 
public debt and debt defaults with severe adverse consequences for economic, social and other human 
rights. According to the FRA, the ‘EU institutions reacted promptly and comprehensively to the 
economic crisis taking steps that have supported the protection of fundamental rights in many ways’.39 
In response to the 2012 ‘Lijkanen report’ on reforms of the EU banking sector in order to shield 
(Contd.)                                                                  
its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; 
that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question’, Case 
C-373/00, Truly, ECR 2003 I-1932, para. 35.  
36 This term continues to be used by both the political EU institutions and the CJEU (e.g. in Joined cases C-120 and C-121/06 
P, FIAMM [2008] ECR I-6513, para. 119) as the main justification for their disregard of legally binding WTO rules and 
WTO dispute settlement rulings. 
37 Protecting Fundamental Rights during the Economic Crisis, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Working Paper 
December 2010. 
38 Note 37, at 27. 
39 Note 37, at 45. 
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taxpayers from future bailouts and avoid shocks to the financial system, a group of independent UN 
human rights experts emphasized in October 2012 that the unforeseen spending by European countries 
of 4.5 trillion Euros (2008-2011) for rescuing their financial institutions risked undermining public 
budgetary resources for fulfilling the human rights of poor persons. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt 
The potentially detrimental effects of foreign debts and associated austerity programs on the 
realisation of human rights are also emphasized in the ‘Guiding Principles on foreign debt’ adopted by 
the UN Human Rights Council in July 2012, whose Principles 8 and 9 read: 
‘(8) Any foreign debt strategy must be designed not to hamper the improvement of conditions 
guaranteeing the enjoyment of human rights and must be directed, inter alia, to ensuring that 
debtor States achieve an adequate level of growth to meet their social and economic needs and 
their development requirements, as well as fulfilment of their human rights obligations.’ 
‘(9) International financial organizations and private corporations have an obligation to respect 
human rights. This implies a duty to refrain from formulating, adopting, funding and implementing 
policies and programmes which directly or indirectly contravene the enjoyment of human rights’.40 
Similar concerns were voiced by the UN Committee overseeing the implementation of the ICESCR in 
its ‘concluding observations on Spain’ adopted in June 2012: 
‘The Committee expresses concern that the levels of effective protection for the rights enshrined in 
the Covenant have been reduced as a result of the austerity measures adopted by the State party, 
which disproportionately curtail the enjoyment of their rights by disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups, especially the poor, women, children, persons with disabilities, 
unemployed adults and young persons, older persons, gypsies, migrants and asylum seekers (Art.2, 
para.1). The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that all the austerity measures 
adopted reflect the minimum core content of all the Covenant rights and that it take all appropriate 
measures to protect that core content under any circumstances, especially for disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and groups’…41  
In its ‘general comments’, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasizes 
that – even if Article 2 ICESCR allows states to realize economic and social rights ‘progressively’ 
with due regard to their ‘available resources’ – there are minimum core obligations which every state 
must fulfil.42 Even though international organizations are usually not parties to state-centred UN 
human rights conventions, UN resolutions recognize that ‘inalienable’ human rights are limiting the 
powers not only of states, but also abuses of power by non-state actors and international organizations 
exercising delegated powers.43 The ‘conditionality’ of financial assistance granted by the IMF, the EU 
and creditor countries to over-indebted borrowing countries tends to be determined primarily from 
economic and policy perspectives aimed at correcting the root causes of unsustainable debts and 
related governance failures in debtor countries (like corruption, a dysfunctional tax system and 
uncompetitive labour markets in Greece, inadequate banking regulation and supervision in Ireland and 
Cyprus). As states may subject economic, social and cultural rights only ‘to such limitations as are 
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely 
for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’ (Article 4 ICESCR), 
democratic discourse and decisions on reducing unsustainable public debts by adjusting the social 
                                                     
40  Resolution 20/10 of 18 July 2012, A/HRC/RES/20/10, para. 2. The Guidelines had been proposed in the ‘Report of the 
Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights’, A/HRC/20/23 of 10 April 2012. 
41 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations regarding Spain, E/C.12/ESP/CO/5 of 6 
June 2012, para. 7.  
42 Cf. M.Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 66 ff. 
43 Cf. note 40 and Petersmann (note 1), chapter IV. 
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spending of debtor states to their financial resources must take into account the social impact of 
austerity measures on human rights, for instance in the examination of alternative policy measures 
(such as tax increases and prevention of tax evasion rather than cuts in public spending, reduction of 
military budgets rather than social budgets, introduction of user fees for essential public services rather 
than privatization entailing price increases excluding the poor).44 The ‘human rights consistency’ of 
‘debt brakes’ introduced into national constitutional or legislative provisions (e.g. as required by the 
‘Fiscal Compact’ concluded by 25 EU member states and in force since 1 January 2013) can be 
justified by their policy objective of promoting savings, investments and economic welfare through 
financial stability and legal security. The legal consistency of ‘bailout provisions’ imposing losses on 
private creditors (e.g. owners of Greek government bonds) with the property rights of adversely 
affected investors depend on the particular circumstances (e.g. the market value of government bonds, 
the consent of private bond holders, the shared responsibilities of creditors and debtors).    
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations 
UN law distinguishes between obligations of states to protect human rights beyond the national 
territory and obligations of international assistance and cooperation.45 In the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, extra-territorial obligations to protect human rights are recognized (1) if a state exercises 
‘effective overall control’ over another territory; (2) if state authorities act abroad or their actions 
produce foreseeable extraterritorial effects; (3) if extradition or expulsion involves risks for the 
individual’s rights once he leaves the territory; and (4) diplomatic, consular and flag jurisdiction 
cases.46 The Human Rights Committee, in its 2012 Concluding Observations on Germany’s periodic 
report on its implementation of the ICCPR, recognized extraterritorial obligations to prevent German 
companies acting abroad from contributing to human rights violations (forced evictions from an 
African village in order to make way for a new coffee plantation by a foreign investor). Similarly, the 
EU CFR, including its comprehensive guarantees of economic and social rights, may be applicable 
also in the external relations of EU institutions and EU member states (cf. Article 21 TEU) in order to 
justify EU measures aimed at preventing EU companies from negatively affecting the enjoyment of 
human rights abroad (e.g. the right of access to water in foreign jurisdictions, as recognized by various 
UN resolutions). The ‘human rights clauses’ included into EU agreements with more than 130 third 
states pursue both ‘domestic policy functions’ (e.g. for justifying EU sanctions against human rights 
violators abroad) as well as ‘foreign policy functions’, for example in order ‘to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant’ (Article 2 ICESCR). As the EU has so far acceded to only 
one UN human rights convention, the EU’s human rights clauses focus on general UN HRL as 
specified in the UDHR unless all contracting states are members of the same human rights convention 
(e.g. the ECHR).  
                                                     
44 The UN ‘Report of the independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial 
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights’ 
(A/67/304 of 13 August 2012) claims, for instance, ‘that women are disproportionately affected by debt and related 
conditionalities, and that debt and related economic reform policies have, in many contexts, contributed significantly to 
the impoverishment and marginalization of women’ (p.2) and to violations of human rights to education, health, adequate 
housing, work, food, water and sanitation (p.4). 
45  Cf. De Schutter (note 10), at  162 ff, 172 ff. 
46  Cf. S.Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction : A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 
European Convention, in : EJIL 20 (2009), 1223-1246. 
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HRL Requires Cosmopolitan Rights 
As UN human rights conventions offer no effective judicial remedies, some human rights advocates 
argue that economic agreements offering material benefits for compliance with human rights, 
changing the ‘cost-benefit calculations’ of human rights violators, and setting incentives for 
‘participatory democracy’ may be more important for promoting human rights and satisfying basic 
needs than pushing more countries to ratify UN human rights conventions.47 The 2011 ‘Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’, elaborated and adopted by a group of independent human rights experts, can serve as 
‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’ in terms of Article 38, para. 1 (d) ICJ Statute 
(referring to ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’) in legal and 
judicial clarifications of the human rights dimensions of IEL (e.g. obligations of states to contribute to 
the global realization of the human rights of access to food, healthcare and adequate standards of 
living).48 The jurisprudence of European courts suggests that the necessary ‘balancing’ of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights in interpreting IEL cannot rely on a simplistic ‘human 
rights primacy’ over constitutional guarantees of economic rights that are unduly neglected in UN 
HRL (like freedom of profession, common market freedoms, author rights and other property rights 
guaranteed in European constitutional and HRL).49 For instance, the distortion of international 
agricultural trade by EU and US subsidies (amounting to ca US$ 350 billion p.a.) may be justifiable on 
constitutional and human rights grounds (e.g. in terms of promoting food security in Europe, the US as 
well as in net-food-importing countries) as well as on grounds of ‘commutative justice’ (as defined in 
WTO law) notwithstanding trade-distorting effects on farmers in third countries, which remain free to 
prevent ‘harmful externalities’ by means of countervailing duties and other safeguard measures. 
Similarly, EU bailout agreements supporting austerity measures (e.g. in Greece) may be justifiable on 
constitutional and human rights grounds (e.g. in terms of providing additional resources for protecting 
human rights, preventing more severe alternative policies, justifying ‘human rights conditionality’ in 
parliamentary ‘austerity legislation’) as well as on grounds of ‘commutative justice’ (as defined in EU 
law and bailout agreements) even if they cannot prevent inevitable reductions of unsustainable debt 
and financial policies threatening the human rights of younger and future generations in the debtor 
country.50 Articles 2 and 4 ICESCR confirm that human rights must shape democratic and 
international decision-making on reconciling economic and social rights in economic crises 
notwithstanding the legitimacy also of other economic, political and legal considerations in democratic 
‘human rights impact assessments’. For example, the lifting of millions of Chinese citizens out of 
poverty due to the welfare gains enabled by the WTO membership of China, Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan confirms that – had China complied with GATT rules since its 1948 GATT membership rather 
than withdrawing from GATT in 1949 – the impoverishment of hundreds of millions of Chinese 
citizens could have been avoided.    
                                                     
47  Cfg. E.M.Hafner-Burton, Forced to be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights, Cornell University Press, 
2009.  
48  The principles are reproduced and commented upon in: M.Langford/W.Vandenhole/ M.Scheinin/W.Genugten (eds), 
Global Justice, State Duties: The Extra-Territorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 
(Cambridge : CUP, 2013),  
49  Cf. the case-law discussed by Petersmann (note 1), chapters IV and VIII. 
50 Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the UN ‘Guiding Principles for foreign debt and human rights’ (note 40) confirm that 
‘retrogressive measures’ due to lack of budgetary resources may be justifiable in terms of ‘progressive implementation of 
economic and social rights’ (Article 2 ICESCR) also in case of legal obligations to repay external debts. 
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VI. Human Rights Require Cosmopolitan Law and Transnational ‘Rule of Law’ for 
the Benefit of Citizens  
Sections I and II explained why the transformation of ever more national into transnational 
‘aggregate public goods’ requires ‘constitutionalizing’ and ‘civilizing’ the power-oriented conceptions 
of ‘Westphalian governance’ (e.g. in UN and WTO institutions) on the basis of ‘cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism’ empowering citizens and multilevel governance institutions to collectively supply 
international public goods demanded by citizens. Section III argued that the ‘governance failures’ of 
state-centred ‘Westphalian regimes’ to protect international public goods in democratic and more 
effective ways are due to their ‘Westphalian neglect’ of the customary law requirement of interpreting 
and developing IEL ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’ and the human rights obligations of 
all UN member states. Section IV discussed why ‘human rights approaches’ to collective supply of 
international public goods must be supplemented by constitutional and economic regulation and 
limitation of ‘governance failures’ as well as of ‘market failures’. Section V discussed European and 
UN responses to the worldwide financial and social crises since 2008, including the emphasis by 
European and UN human rights bodies on protecting human rights from being adversely affected by 
economic austerity programs and international debt and bailout arrangements. This Section VI 
concludes by summarizing the European and UN initiatives for strengthening ‘access to justice’ and 
transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens as legal preconditions for the collective protection 
of many international public goods like human rights, democratic self-government, an efficient global 
division of labour protecting the basic needs of all human beings, and ‘sustainable development’ 
promoting the ‘human capabilities’ of all. The current economic, social and legal crises reflect 
democratic failures of citizens to protect their human rights and democratic self-governance – beyond 
parliamentary and constitutional democracies in national jurisdictions – on the basis of ‘cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism’ and ‘cosmopolitan law’ expanding the limited human rights guarantees of access to 
justice to all intergovernmental restrictions of fundamental rights, as provided for in Article 47 of the 
EU CFR: 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right 
to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.’       
Need for Cosmopolitan Law Beyond HRL 
In worldwide institutions governing transnational cooperation among citizens without effective 
parliamentary control (such as UN and WTO institutions), the power-oriented ‘intergovernmentalism’ 
focusing on rights of the rulers must be limited by cosmopolitan law protecting 'cosmopolitan justice' 
as defined by human rights - rather than only ‘Hobbesian justice’ as defined by power-oriented 
conceptions of 'sovereign equality of states' (e.g. in UN law) and utilitarian ‘commutative justice as 
reciprocal trade among customs territories’ (e.g. in WTO law). Cosmopolitanism recognizes 
democracies as communitarian values and 'collective responsibilities' that must be reconciled with the 
human rights imperative of ‘cosmopolitan justice’. The systemic neglect of the right to ‘a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ 
(Article 28 UDHR) by all UN member states is the central ‘constitutional problem’ of the 21st 
century. The reality of ‘reasonable disagreement’ on conceptions of HRL must be respected, for 
example the potential justification of 'social contracts' by utilitarian self-interests and basic needs (e.g. 
'Hobbesian social contracts' focusing on peaceful order) rather than by constitutional rights (e.g. as 
claimed by peoples in human rights revolutions), Kantian 'moral imperatives', Aristotelian virtue 
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ethics or contractarian constitutionalism (e.g. in terms of Rawlsian 'justice as fairness'). The necessary 
reconciliation of national constitutionalism (e.g. our duties to national compatriots) with transnational 
'cosmopolitan constitutionalism' (e.g. our duties vis-à-vis foreigners so as to protect everyone's human 
rights and human capabilities) can be based on diverse moral, political and legal principles and 
procedures. Hence, diplomats, economists and 'realist politicians' unfamiliar with HRL prefer 
analysing the regulatory problems of international public goods from political and economic 
perspectives such as public goods theories, realist pursuit of 'national interests', protection of basic 
human needs and 'human capabilities'.51 Even if one accepts the Rawlsian argument that social welfare 
and human 'capabilities' depend primarily on national democratic institutions and political virtues, a 
mutually beneficial global division of labour can enhance individual and national welfare in all states 
and contribute to promoting satisfaction of basic needs and human rights of all human beings. 
Cosmopolitan rights entail 'duties to protect' and to 'struggle for justice' so as to avoid contributing to 
injustices, for instance in terms of the widespread abuses by non-democratic rulers of their 'borrowing 
privilege' and 'resource privilege' at the cost of domestic citizens.52  
Cosmopolitan law aims at strengthening cosmopolitan rights beyond HRL, for instance by protecting 
citizens against the ubiquity of abuses of public and private power in IEL. The 2012 ‘UN Guiding 
Principles’ on foreign debt and human rights draw attention to the adverse impact of excessive debt 
burdens on human rights and development; they highlight the need for striking an appropriate balance 
between the obligations of states arising from their external debt arrangements and HRL. The human 
rights to individual and democratic self-determination suggest that – just as individuals and families 
have to assume responsibility for their self-development – democratic societies have ‘primary 
responsibility’ for organizing a social division of labour protecting the human rights and fulfilling the 
basic needs of all citizens. If, as explained by Rawls in conformity with economic theory, each people 
can agree on social and constitutional arrangements that provide its citizens with the natural and social 
goods essential for satisfying basic needs, then ‘responsible sovereignty’ of peoples and self-
responsibility of individuals have legal priority over subsidiary, transnational human rights duties to 
assist foreign people and foreigners in protecting their human rights and basic needs.53 As debt 
financing can contribute to countries’ development, reconciling IEL with HRL depends on context-
specific ‘balancing’ of human rights and related economic regulation, for instance regarding the terms, 
conditions and prudent use of loan funds and effective debt management. HRL and equity may require 
‘rebalancing’ a debtor and creditor state’s contractual obligations arising from external debt 
arrangements in order to avoid adverse effects of external debt servicing on the enjoyment of human 
rights in conformity with the shared responsibility of creditors and debtors, notably in case of ‘odious’ 
and ‘illegitimate’ external debt consented by non-democratic rulers without benefits for the debtor 
state’s population.54 Also international organizations and private corporations have legal obligations to 
                                                     
51 For an overview see: G.Brock, Global Justice. A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: OUP, 2009), chapter 3; M.C.Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
52 Cf. T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
53 On the Rawlsian theory of justice, and the justified cosmopolitan criticism of Rawls’ theory of international justice, see: 
Petersmann (note 1), e.g. at 342 ff; Brock (note 51), chapter 2. On the moral significance of national borders see also: 
J.Mandle, Global Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). 
54 On the contribution of human rights to the formulation of the concept of ‘illegitimate debt’, and the ‘Monterrey Consensus’ 
that creditor and debtor countries are both equally responsible for preventing and resolving unsustainable debt situations, 
see the 2009 Report of the independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial 
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights (A/64/289 of 12 August 2009). Resolution 20/10 by the UN 
Human Rights Council (see note 40) ‘reaffirms the fact that the exercise of the basic rights of the people of the debtor 
countries to food, housing, clothing, employment, education, health services and a healthy environment cannot be 
subordinated to the implementation of structural adjustment policies, growth programs and economic reforms arising 
from the debt’ (para. 24). The need for policy coherence in the areas of trade and finance is emphasized in the 2010 
‘Report of the independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of 
States on the full enjoyment of human rights’ (A/65/260 of 9 August 2010). The 2009 Report of the independent expert 
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respect human rights as ‘constitutional status rights’ protecting individuals against abuses of public 
and private powers. The scope of these human rights obligations remains contested, for instance 
regarding ‘corporate social responsibilities’ of multinational enterprises and ‘vulture funds’ that 
purchase defaulted foreign debt at significant discounts and subsequently litigate for full repayments.55 
Access to Justice: Lessons from European Law for UN/WTO law and IEL 
From a human rights perspective, justice is a human right – rather than only a service provided by 
governments to citizens - to effective protection of human rights, equal access to all governance 
institutions and to judicial and non-judicial remedies against violations of human rights, democratic 
governance and rule of law. The empirical fact that cosmopolitan legal and economic regimes (like EU 
and EEA common market law, the ECHR, investment and commercial law and arbitration) protect 
general consumer welfare, basic needs and human rights of citizens more effectively than Westphalian 
regimes prioritizing rights of governments confirms that the effectiveness of law and institutions 
depends on their democratic legitimacy and support by citizens.56 The fact that – in contrast to EU law 
– most regional and worldwide economic agreements do not even mention human rights and offer 
citizens no effective legal, democratic and judicial remedies against injuries suffered from 
intergovernmental power politics undermines human rights, especially the rights of poor and 
vulnerable people in times of economic crises resulting from systemic violations of rule of law (e.g. in 
corrupt debtor countries like Greece and many less-developed countries). The legal and social studies 
by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency on ‘access to justice’ during the European economic crises 
revealed that – even in some EU member countries (like Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania) - up to 
three quarters of the population lost trust in the national judicial system, whose ‘justice budgets’ were 
cut by austerity measures.57 In regional and worldwide governance systems for protecting public 
goods, democracy and rule of law depend on participatory rights of citizens to act as ‘agents of justice’ 
at national and transnational levels of multilevel governance (e.g. by challenging in national courts 
welfare-reducing violations of WTO obligations ratified by national parliaments). The right to an 
effective judicial remedy enshrined in Article 47 CFR remains the most quoted Charter right in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU enabling citizens, companies and other non-governmental organizations to 
defend their rights under EU law and their reasonable self-interests in ‘the rule of law’ (Article 2 TEU) 
and the effectiveness of EU rules, e.g. on non-discriminatory conditions of competition, subsidiarity 
and proportionality of EU regulations (cf. Article 5 TEU), participatory and ‘deliberative democracy’ 
(cf. Articles 9-12 TEU). Extending ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ to multilevel governance in UN 
and WTO institutions requires following the example of Article 47 by empowering citizens to 
challenge welfare-reducing violations of precise and unconditional UN and WTO guarantees of 
freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law in domestic courts. Without such ‘countervailing rights’ 
of self-interested citizens and democratic institutions to challenge intergovernmental power politics, 
the frequent violations of UN HRL and of WTO guarantees of non-discriminatory access to foreign 
markets will continue being abused to the detriment of citizens and their cosmopolitan rights. 
Democratic participation and, if necessary, litigation in courts of justice remain the most effective 
‘countervailing powers’ of citizens against the widespread abuses of human rights in so many UN 
member states. As court proceedings are complex, costly and time-consuming, legal aid, non-judicial 
(Contd.)                                                                  
argues ‘that a human rights-based approach to foreign debt offers specific value through its emphasis on participation, 
non-discrimination, transparency, accountability and the universality, interdependence and indivisibility of all human 
rights, to ensure that the goals of development in general and debt relief measures in particular are consistent with 
international human rights standards’ (A/HRC/11/10 of 3 April 2009, at p.2). 
55 For case studies, see the 2010 Report of the independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international 
financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights (A/HRC/14/21 of 29 April 2010, at p. 7 ff). 
56 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), chapter II.  
57 Cf. Access to Justice in Europe: An Overview of Challenges and Opportunities (Vienna, 2011); Access to Justice in Cases 
of Discrimination in the EU (Vienna, 2012).   
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remedies, advice by non-governmental organizations and reforms of the judiciary may be 
preconditions for public interest litigation and for effective ‘access to justice’ by vulnerable groups 
(such as children, migrants, persons with disabilities, victims of discrimination). The economic costs 
of ‘justice systems’ illustrate the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights as preconditions for both democratic 
self-governments and social welfare. The more than 13’000 violation judgments rendered by the 
ECtHR since its inception, including more than 10’000 findings of violations of the right to a fair trial 
within a reasonable time or of the right to an effective remedy, confirm that - for justice being secured 
– judicial procedures must be supplemented by multilevel legal cooperation.  
Multilevel Judicial Protection of Transnational Rule of Law for the Benefit of Citizens 
Human rights and democratic self-government cannot be effective without rule of law. Just as 
‘constitutional democracy’ requires constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial 
‘institutionalization’ of ‘public reason’, citizens are also collectively responsible for protecting 
‘constitutional justice’ in all multilevel governance institutions and for invoking judicial remedies in 
courts. The ‘rational ignorance’ of individuals vis-à-vis most governmental violations of IEL rules 
requires not only limiting the ‘information gaps’, ‘incentive gaps’, ‘participation gaps’ and 
‘jurisdiction gaps’ impeding the supply of international public goods58, for instance by limiting abuses 
of governance powers through individual access to judicial remedies correcting violations of justice. 
There is also a need for establishing human rights agencies and ‘justice systems’ protecting 
transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. Similar to the rights-based EU guarantees of an 
‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (cf. Articles 67 ff TFEU) based on multilevel legal and judicial 
protection of constitutional rights of all 500 million EU citizens across national frontiers, UN HRL 
requires protecting transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens rather than only in terms of 
rights and obligations of the rulers. Justice as defined by human rights must be institutionalized in all 
areas of international law in order to limit abuses of public and private power more effectively by 
promoting cooperation, ‘mutual recognition’ and effective enforcement of multilevel ‘justice systems’ 
linking multilevel ‘justice chains’, rights and remedies for collective supply of international public 
goods for the benefit of citizens. 
The UN is providing ‘rule of law assistance programs’ for almost 150 member states and fosters rule 
of law at the international level through codification and development of international rules, 
international courts, non-judicial dispute resolution and accountability mechanisms and the 
strengthening of rule of law at regional levels.59 The UN ‘Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of 
the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’ of 24 September 
2012 emphasized the systemic importance of ‘an international order based on the rule of law’ as 
‘indispensable foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world’: ‘human rights, the rule of 
law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and … belong to the universal and 
indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations.’60 The annual reports by the UN 
Secretary-General on ‘The Rule of law at the national and international levels’ define the ‘rule of law’ 
‘as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced 
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of 
law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
                                                     
58 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), at 25 ff, 56 ff, 94 ff.  
59 Cf. Strengthening and Coordinating UN Rule of Law Activities. Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/290, 10 August 
2012.   
60  A/RES/67/1, paras. 1,5. 
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separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency’.61   
The veto-powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the acceptance of the 
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction by only 66 member states, the lack of parliamentary UN institutions, of 
effective democratic and judicial remedies of citizens under UN law and of democratic and 
independent judicial institutions inside many UN member states illustrate that the UN governance 
system itself does not meet the rule-of-law standards it proclaims. As ‘rule of law reforms’ generate 
winners and losers and – according to the UN Secretary-General himself – ‘political will to ensure 
consistent compliance with existing international obligations remains weak’ among many rulers 
benefitting from the lack of legal and democratic accountability62, citizens are bound to remain 
‘losers’ under the Westphalian UN governance system unless they succeed in ‘constitutionalizing’ the 
intergovernmental abuses of power. 
Conclusion: Multilevel Constitutionalism Depends on ‘Struggles for Justice’ and 
‘Cosmopolitan Public Reason’ 
The IEL crises require a new kind of multilevel ‘cosmopolitan law’ that must remain constitutionally 
constrained by multilevel constitutional protection of cosmopolitan rights and transnational rule of law 
for the benefit of citizens. The prevailing ‘constitutional nationalism’ and ‘Westphalian 
intergovernmentalism’ do not effectively protect international public goods demanded by citizens. 
Westphalian prioritization of rights of states - without effective legal, democratic and judicial remedies 
of citizens against harmful violations of international law - undermines international public goods. 
European history confirms that transforming national into regional democracies requires ‘struggles for 
justice’ and judicial protection of cosmopolitan international law and human rights. After more than 
10 years of Doha Round negotiations in the WTO, the leading trading nations rightly prioritize 
regional free trade agreements and functional plurilateral agreements (like the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement, the Information Technology Agreement) as political ‘second-best solutions’ 
in order to overcome the protectionist interest group politics preventing worldwide agreement among 
WTO members on worldwide trade liberalization and regulation. In international financial regulation, 
democracies prioritize regulating ‘market failures’ (like under-regulation of financial services and 
banks) and ‘governance failures’ (e.g. in the Eurozone) inside national and regional jurisdictions in 
view of the disagreement on worldwide reforms. The economic crises offer opportunities for 
reforming ineffective governance structures, for instance of multilevel monetary and financial 
regulation. In the absence of legal hierarchies among most functionally limited public goods regimes, 
their mutual coherence requires inclusive ‘legal dialogues’ and ‘judicial balancing’ limited by 
common constitutional principles (eg in HRL) underlying ‘multilevel constitutional pluralism’. 
‘Constitutional reforms’ of Westphalian governance in UN institutions remain unlikely without 
stronger ‘struggles for justice’ by citizens and democracies. Building more democratic, regional 
‘cosmopolitan legal regimes’ - like the proposed ‘Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement’ among 
NAFTA, EU and EEA democracies and stronger, multilevel judicial protection of regional human 
rights regimes and bilateral investment agreements – remains the most realistic strategy for 
incremental reforms of Westphalian governance institutions. As long as the US Congress and 
discretionary EU policies remain dominated by selfish interest groups and multilevel judicial 
protection of human rights and of transnational rule of law remain underdeveloped outside Europe, 
incremental ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ may be a more realistic paradigm for ‘transitional justice’ in 
international governance reforms than ‘cosmopolitan justice’ in view of the opposition by many 
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governments to stronger cosmopolitan rights, democratic accountability and judicial remedies of 
citizens in multilevel governance of international public goods. -      
 
  
 
